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LOUISE A. DRAZICH, aka 
LOUISE ANN DRAZICH, as an 
individual, and LOUISE A. 
DRAZICH as Trustee of Trusts 
created by the Will of 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: 
. • ty ~'- bripf •'" refers lo the transcript ~f the proceedings 
from the tria ,'• volumes and -• refers lo 
volume one and the seconc 
heai ing refers . :ecord u*. LA*.- L U U U , and "Ex" refers t-«» 
exhibit, followed by the exhibit number, 
By stipulation the claims againsl I I I I H t t - M i i d a r i , ! «, in iiiih Il W'liii II 
wei e i esoJ 1 e ;:I a: i i ti ie c:i a:i m against them was dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION: 
This court has iurisdict~ 
> --•..-.: J--..^- ...ah v.:oue a n n o t a t e d , Rule of the Ut -; 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Sections 3 and 5, Article VIII wi 
the Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW: 
ISSUE ONE 
IN THE INDENTURE TO THE D.& R. G. RAILROAD, DID THE TERMS 
THEREIN CONSTITUTE TERMS OF CONVEYANCE WHEREBY FEE TITLE TO 
THE LAND IN QUESTION WAS CONVEYED, OR, DID THE TERMS MERELY 
CONVEY A RIGHT-OF-WAY THAT WAS SUBJECT TO ABANDONMENT, WAS 
ABANDONED, AND THUS NOTHING WAS EVER CONVEYED FROM THE 
RAILROAD TO ITS GRANTEE AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO APPELLANT DRAZICH? 
Standards for Review: 
(1) A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are 
reviewed or correctness and therefore no deference is given to the 
trial court's ruling on questions of law. State v. Pena, 869 P2d 
932 (Utah 1994); United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater park City 
Co., 870 P2d 880 (Utah 1993). 
(2) In reviewing issues of law the standard is an assessment 
for correctness. State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P2d 1342 (Utah 
1990). 
ISSUE TWO 
WERE THERE VALID AND EFFECTIVE CONVEYANCES THAT ESTABLISHED 
A CHAIN OF TITLE TO DRAZICH THAT WOULD PRECLUDE PROTECTION 
FOR LASSON UNDER THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT? 
Standards for Review: 
See standards for issue number one above. 
ISSUE THREE 
DOES THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT PROVIDE PROTECTION TO 
A PARTY FROM CLAIMS EXISTING IN A PARALLEL CHAIN OF TITLE? 
Standards for Review: 
(1) See standards for issue number one above. 
(2) In reviewing the trial court's findings, the clearly 
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erroneous standard is applied. Bell v. Elder, 782 P2d 545 (Ut. 
App. 1989) 
(3) A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without 
adequate evidentiary foundation or if it is induced by an erroneous 
view of the law. Cove View Excavating & Const, v. Flynn# 758 P2d 
474 (Utah 1988). 
(4) On appeal the appellate court must review facts in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party. Lamkin v. Lynch# 600 
P2d 530 (Utah 1979). 
PLEASE NOTE: In the argument all issues pertaining to the 
Marketable Title Act are argued under Point IV jointly for the sake 
of brevity and clarity. 
ISSUE FOUR 
DID THE APPELLEE LASSON ACQUIRE TITLE TO THE DISPUTED 
TRACT BY ADVERSE POSSESSION? 
Standards for Review: 
See standards set forth above. 
ISSUE FIVE 
DID THE APPELLEE LASSON ACQUIRE TITLE TO THE DISPUTED 
TRACT BY VIRTUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE? 
Standards for Review: 
See standards set forth above. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES: 
MARKETABLE TITLE ACT STATUTES 
57-9-1 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM 
"What constitutes marketable record title." 
57-9-2 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM 
"Rights and interests to which marketable 
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record title is subject." 
57-9-3 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM 
"Marketable record title held free and 
clear of interests, claims and charges." 
ADVERSE POSSESSION STATUTES 
78-12-7 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM 
"Adverse possession - Possession presumed 
in owner." 
78-12-8 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM 
"Under written instrument or judgment." 
78-12-9 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM 
"What constitutes adverse possession under 
written instrument." 
78-12-10 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM 
"Under claim not founded on written instrument 
or j udgment." 
78-12-11 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM 
"What constitutes adverse possession not 
under written instrument." 
78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated SEE ADDENDUM 
"Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This action involves a dispute over ownership of a parcel of 
land approximately 78 feet in length and of varying width of 
approximately 11 feet to 22 feet. The area in dispute forms a 
portion of the north boundary of the Drazich lands and the south 
boundary of the Lasson land. The legal descriptions in their 
current deeds of conveyance overlap. 
The record title to the area in dispute was originally 
acquired by the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company as 
part of its rail system in Salt Lake County, over which a spur 
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track was maintained for many years. 
On September 3, 1958, the railroad conveyed fee title to the 
disputed area to Building Supply Center, and by mesne deeds of 
record, title thereto has devolved to Drazich. Lasson does not 
claim or assert any conveyance from the railroad as a basis for his 
title but relies upon mesne deeds which by survey and description 
appear to overlap the lands conveyed to Drazich. 
Issues exist over the nature of a fence line and its effect 
upon the title, the uses made of the land by the parties, 
acquiescence to boundary, the nature of the interest conveyed 
initially to the railroad, methods of description in the various 
deeds, and other related issues* 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: 
The case was tried without a jury before the honorable William 
Bohling in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, in 
September of 1996. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT: 
The respective parties submitted proposed findings and 
conclusions and the court took the matter under advisement. The 
court ruled that Lasson had acquired title to the subject property 
and the findings and conclusions of the defendant Lasson were 
adopted by the court. & Judgment and Order, dated January 3, 1997, 
was signed and entered by the court. No post-judgment motions were 
made. The judgment by the court is a final judgment for purposes 
of this case and this appeal. 
The defendants by the name of White were dismissed earlier in 
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the proceedings by stipulation between the parties. They are not 
parties to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties Drazich and Lasson own pieces of property that 
are contiguous to each other in Salt Lake County in the vicinity of 
4500 South and 300 West. (T. 15; Ex. 4-P) 
2. In order to more clearly demonstrate the chains of title 
for both Drazich and Lasson, the documents comprising the Drazich 
chain of title are collectively compiled in chronological order in 
Exhibit 15-P, and those comprising the Lasson chain are 
collectively compiled in Exhibit 16-P, both of which exhibits were 
received by the court. Those chains of title are outlined as 
follows: 
DRAZICH CHAIN: 
3. Under a homestead certificate of 1875 the United States 
conveyed real property that includes the disputed tract to James 
Bell. It conveyed a portion of a quarter section. 
4. By indenture Bell conveyed to Helm in 1877. 
5. By indenture Helm conveyed to the Denver and Rio Grande 
Railroad in 1882. 
6. By special warranty deed the Denver & Rio Grande conveyed 
the property to Building Supply Center. 
7. Building Supply then conveyed by deed to Ewell & Son; they 
by deed to Ute-Liner; they by deed to D.C. Johnson; he by deed to 
Michie Associations; they by deed to Homco; they by deed to First 
Security Bank; they by deed to Daw. 
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8. Daw then conveyed by Warranty Deed to Drazich in 1993. 
END OF DRAZICH CHAIN 
LASSON CHAIN: 
9. Jenkins conveyed by warranty deed to Dahlquist in 1931. 
10. Dahlquist by warranty deed in 1940 to Anderson. 
11. Anderson by warranty deed to Eastman in 1948. 
12. S. Eastman to G. Eastman by warranty deed in 1950. 
13. G. Eastman to S. Eastman in 1951 by warranty deed. 
14. S. Eastman to S. Eastman, et al. by quit claim deed in 
1993. 
15. S. Eastman, et al to Alan Lasson in 1993 by warranty deed. 
END OF LASSON CHAIN 
16. In the Lasson chain, until 1950 in the conveyance from 
Stanley Eastman to Glen Eastman, all of the descriptions of the 
south boundary of what is now the Lasson tract designated the 
south boundary as being one rod from the center of the track. 
(Ex. 16-P) 
17. There was testimony by Arlen Taylor, a witness for Lasson, 
that the descriptions in the deeds prior to 1950 were using metes 
and bounds and not calling to the center line of the railroad. (T. 
157-158) However, all deeds in the Lasson chain (Ex. 16-P) do tie 
to the railroad center line until you get to the Stanley Eastman-
Glen Eastman deed of 1950 when it is dropped. (Ex. 8-P) 
18. The witness Taylor also testified that the current 
description of the Lasson property is "fairly similar" to that 
described in the earlier deeds. (T. 156) 
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19. In 1950, Stanley Eastman, et ux, conveyed by warranty deed 
to Glen Eastman, but all reference to the railroad disappears and 
for reasons that are unknown metes and bounds using measurements in 
chains is substituted. (Ex. 8-P; T. 47) At this point the tie-in 
to the center line of the railroad is eliminated. 
20. These conflicting legal descriptions create an overlap 
parcel approximately 78 feet long and varying in width from 11 to 
22 feet. 
21. This overlap occurred of record with the 1958 Special 
Warranty Deed from the railroad to Building Supply Center. (Ex. 2-
P) 
22. In 1910 the railroad prepared a map of their spur line, 
which included the subject property. (Ex. 5-P; T. 36) 
23. The area colored in yellow on the exhibit depicts the land 
in the legal description included in the 1958 Special Warranty Deed 
from the railroad to Building Supply Center. (T. 37) 
24. Abraham Helm, by his indenture dated August 29, 1882,(Ex. 
15-P) conveyed to the Denver and Rio Grand Railway Company fee 
title to a strip of land which extended from the main line of the 
railroad company's railroad tracks, in a northeasterly direction, 
over and across the lands owned by Helm. The description contained 
in the indenture describes the land to which the interest related 
as being a corridor two rods in width, lying 16 1/2 feet on either 
side of the center line of an existing railroad track, which area 
includes the area in dispute in the instant case. (R. 233) 
25. The railroad tracks lying within the corridor were removed 
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in approximately 1904, but no precise legal description of the 
location of the tracks was recorded. (R. 233) The courtfs finding 
number 7 that there was confusion at some time in the past as to 
the location of the tracks seems true only to a degree. There was 
only one witness for Lasson who thought the track location had 
shifted. (T. Sept. 27 Trans, p. 18) No other witness for either 
side came to this conclusion. This witness for Lasson did not say 
where or how the track position changed. 
26. Arlen Taylor also testified that the deed from the 
railroad to Building Supply covers the area in dispute, that it is 
described in that deed by a metes and bounds description, and that 
there is a conflict between the Lasson deed and the Drazich deed. 
(T. 170) 
27. By stipulation the parties agreed that title to the 
disputed parcel was vested in Drazich, although Lasson did not 
agree that such a vesting was fee title. (T. 81-83) 
28. Arlen Taylor acknowledged that he had heard the 
stipulation whereby it was agreed that record title was in the 
plaintiff and that he did not dispute that fact based upon the 
evidence he had examined. (T. 170) 
29.In 1905 the subject property was apparently dropped from 
the tax rolls (T. 153), and was not taxed by the county again until 
1959. (T. 153; R. 3) 
30. The railroad began deeding out portions of the whole rail 
corridor as early as 1926. (T. 157; R. 3) 
31. At the time the deed was given from Helm to the railroad 
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the spur line had already been built, (T. 30), but the railroad 
then said it needed a right-of-way 16.5 feet on each side of the 
track from the center line of the track. (T.30-31) This was 
conveyed. (T. 31) 
32. In 1958 the railroad employed Coon and King Engineers to 
determine the legal description of the property the railroad 
intended to convey to Building Supply. (T. 33) They performed the 
survey, physically staked the property, and formulated a legal 
description that was used in the deed from the railroad to Building 
Supply. (T. 33) 
33. In 1993 the witness Jack DeMass performed a survey of the 
same land and his description, findings and configuration of the 
property were exactly the same as those produced from the Coon and 
King survey of 1958. (T. 33-34) 
34. In researching the location of the D.& R. G. corridor and 
the track, Mr. DeMass researched the railroad and County Recorder 
records. In that investigation he located a map prepared in 1910 
with an affidavit attached to it.(T. 35-37) This is Exhibit 5-P. 
The affidavit was prepared by a Mr. A. Blake, who was the Division 
Engineer for the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Company. (T. 40) 
However, the affidavit had been prepared in 1904. (T. 41) 
35. In part, the affidavit states that Mr. Blake is ". . . 
familiar with the position and location of the tracks of the Rio 
Grande and Western Railway. . . ", and that he had " . . . been 
familiar with the location of said tracks for several years prior 
to said date", said date being 1904. (Ex. 5-P) 
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36. Among the railroad records pertaining to the sale of the 
property to Building Supply was found a set of five sheets of 
paper, the first being a copy of the 1958 deed to Building Supply, 
but the last and fifth sheet being a copy of a map, dated June 11, 
1958. (Ex. 6-P; T. 43) 
37. That map is different in certain respects from the 1910 
map, but the lines conform with the Coon & King survey, and the map 
is likewise consistent with the findings of Mr. DeMass1 prior 
findings. (T. 44) 
38. Based upon the Coon & King survey, the railroad issued a 
Special Warranty Deed to Building Supply (Ex. 2-P), dated September 
3, 1958. (R. 234) The legal description contained in the Special 
Warranty Deed incorporates the parcel of land which is in dispute 
in this case. (R. 234) 
39. Ex. 6-P has a map which was apparently derived from the 
Coon & King survey. That map has a tie from the center line of 
45th South to the northwest corner of the right-of-way. This is 
significant because it is an actual location of where the railroad 
right-of-way was located. (T. 71) The findings of fact (R. 234) 
state that there was no accurate information from Coon & King 
survey as to the location of the rail corridor, but it was 
undisputed that Ex. 6-Pfs map was derived from Coon & King's 
survey, and Mr. DeMass testified that established " . . . where the 
actual location, at least according to the railroad, of where their 
right-of-way was. That's not something to scale, that's a 
definitive." (T. 71) 
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40. Mr. DeMass further testified: "There is a specific tie 
over. Whoever prepared this railroad map tied the center line of 
45th South Street and the corner of this purported railroad 
property with a bearing and a distance. And thatfs exact. That 
can't be off." 
41. Ex. 13-P is a survey done by a Mr. Page for Mr. Lasson, 
the defendant. That survey does not show a fence line along the 
southern boundary, but it dos show the overlap or disputed tract. 
(T. 74) 
42. However, the Page survey is faulty because his distances 
and calls are different from those in the Lasson deed (T. 75); and 
in keeping with what Mr. DeMass concluded in his research, both 
DeMass and Page found that the Lasson deed did not close, so he 
[Page] apparently " . . . chose to force a closure . . . ."(T. 75-
76) 
43. Exhibit 4-P is the DeMass survey. That survey noted the 
existence of fence lines on the properties adjoining properties (T. 
65), but DeMass found no evidence of a fence line running along the 
back of the Green property, which is now the Lasson property. (T. 
17-18) 
44. The Coon & King survey (Ex. 12-D) uses fence line symbols 
to show a fence line running south of what became the White, Green 
(now Lasson) and United Homes properties. (T. 65) The only 
evidence that Lasson found of a fence line in the area of the 
disputed tract was a strip of barbed wire and some burnt wood 
remnants among other debris that he thought looked as if they could 
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have been used at one point in time as fence posts. (T. Sept. 27 
Trans, pp. 52, 63) 
45. If a fence had existed at some location on the disputed 
property, there was absolutely no evidence as to who erected it, 
when, how long it existed, or why it was erected. Lassonrs grantor 
was the only witness to testify that there had been some type of 
old, decrepit fence in the bushes, but again, he was the only 
witness, and his knowledge and description of the "fence" were very 
sketchy at best. (T. 138) 
46. Based upon the Coon & King survey the railroad issued a 
Special Warranty Deed to Building Supply Center in 1958 (Ex. 2-P). 
The legal description used in the deed was the one derived from the 
Coon & King survey. (R. 234) 
47. This Special Warranty Deed contained an exception which 
reads "Subject, however, to all outstanding rights for any and all 
pipe lines, fences, roads, ditches, pole and wire lines and all 
other utility lines now existing upon, under, along, over or across 
said described premises." (Ex. 2-P) 
48. The court found that there was no "clear evidence" that 
the Coon & King survey accurately reflected the historic location 
of the railroad tracts or the corridor through which they 
travelled. (R. 234) However there was considerable evidence by 
several witnesses that indicated that a high reliability existed of 
the survey being accurate as to the location of the railroad tracks 
and the corridor. (T. 71-72; T. 96, 98) 
49. The Findings of Fact found that Lasson and his 
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predecessors in interest have used and occupied the disputed parcel 
since at least 1950. (R. 235) However, the evidence in fact 
indicated that the area was used as a dump yard by unknown persons, 
and that the area was covered with trash, weeds and other types of 
debris. (T. 18) Even Mr. Lasson testified that the property was 
covered with weeds, old out-buildings, "random debris11, metal auto 
parts, old trees, garden-oriented type equipment, etc. (T Sept 27 
Trans, pp. 51,58,63), and that the only use Lasson made of the 
property was to clear some of the weeds and junk from the property 
in 1994. (T Sept 27 Trans. 63) This very limited use by Lasson is 
also evidenced by some of his photographs. (Ex. 28-D, 29-D, 30-D) 
50. There is some evidence from Mr. Lasson that the reason he 
began to construct a fence and clear the property was that shortly 
after he purchased the land he became aware that Mr. Drazich laid 
claim to the disputed tract of property. (T. Sept. 27 Trans, p. 72) 
51. Mr. Lasson testified that he has paid taxes on the 
property deeded to him since the date of his conveyance. (T. Sept. 
27 Trans, p. 68) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: 
THE WORDS OF CONVEYANCE FROM HELM TO THE RAILROAD IN 1882 
DID NOT CONVEY A MERE RIGHT-OF-WAY BUT RATHER, CONVEYED 
FEE SIMPLE TITLE. 
The district court concluded that the words used in the 
conveyance from Helm to the railroad conveyed merely a right-of-way 
that was subject to abandonment and was in fact thereafter 
abandoned by the railroad. (R. 235-236) 
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However, the words used in the indenture clearly convey fee 
title to the railroad, and not a right-of-way. 
POINT II: 
THE DEFENDANT LASSON DID NOT ACQUIRE TITLE TO THE DISPUTED 
PARCEL BY ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
While the conclusions of law do not specifically address this 
issue, the comments of the court during the trial and the findings 
of fact indicate that the court relied upon adverse possession in 
determining that Lasson had acquired title to the property by that 
means. However, the fundamental requirements of acquiring title by 
adverse possession have not been met by Lasson or his predecessors 
in interest. 
POINT III: 
THE DEFENDANT LASSON DID NOT ACQUIRE TITLE TO THE DISPUTED 
TRACT OF LAND BASED UPON THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE. 
As with the adverse possession claim, no specific conclusion 
of law refers to this theory, but title is awarded based upon this 
legal concept considering again the findings made by the court and 
the comments of the court at trial. The appellate courts have 
established four fundamental requirements to establish boundary by 
acquiescence and the defendant Lasson has failed to meet any those 
requirements. 
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THE DEFENDANT LASSON UNDER TERMS AND REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT, NOR DOES THE MARKETABLE TITLE 
APPLY TO THIS FACTUAL SCENARIO. 
Mr. Lasson asserts that the Marketable Title Act deprives Mr. 
Drazich of title to the disputed tract, and quiets title to the 
property in him. However, this is a misapplication and 
misinterpretation of the Marketable Title Act. It does not work to 
aid in quieting title in Lasson, nor does it apply to the factual 
scenario of this case. 
Furthermore, the Marketable Title Act does not protect a party 
from claims in a parallel chain of title. Thus, the Marketable 
Title Act cannot provide Lasson clear title to the property against 
the claims of Drazich. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE WORDS OF CONVEYANCE USED IN THE INDENTURE FROM HELM 
TO THE RAILROAD DID NOT CONVEY A MERE RIGHT-OF-WAY SUBJECT 
TO ABANDONMENT, BUT RATHER, CONVEYED FEE SIMPLE TITLE. 
Lasson has relied heavily on the words of conveyance in the 
indenture from Helm to the railroad to substantiate his point that 
these words were merely a grant of a right-of-way which was subject 
to abandonment, and not a grant in fee. This argument was adopted 
by the district court in its second and third conclusions of law 
(R. 235-236), and is the underpinning for most of the Lasson claims 
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to the property. The result of this conclusion by the court is 
that the railroad was unable to convey fee title to its successors 
in interest. 
The operative language in the indenture (Ex. 15-P) reads in 
relevant part ". . . hereby grants, bargains, sells and conveys to 
the party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever in 
fee, all that land and Real [sic] estate . . . ." It is well known 
that the phrase "Grant, bargain, sell and convey" has long been 
recognized to convey fee title. In fact, this phraseology has 
historically been the language of choice in countless conveyances. 
The use of the word "Grant" was long ago ruled as being 
equivalent to a deed in fee in the case of United States v. 
Northern Pacific Railroad Co.f 12 P. 769, 770, 6 Mont. 351. The 
conveyance language in our case uses as well the word "fee". 
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., states that "Grant" has become a 
generic term applicable to all transfers of real property, and 
cites many supporting cases and authorities thereunder in support 
of its position. 
In Love v. Missouri Union Presbytery, 534 SW2d 511 at 514 (Mo. 
App), the Missouri court states that the ". . . words grant, 
bargain and sell within a deed import the vesting of fee simple 
title." 
In Bender v. Fromberger, 4 U.S. 436 at 440, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the phrase "Grant, Bargain and Sell" 
conveys fee title. See also Rianda v. Watsonville Water & Light 
Co., 93 P 79, 81 (Cal. 1907) The court will note the age of many 
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of these cases. This is indicative of the fact that the phrase 
"Grant, Bargain, Sell and Convey" has long been established as a 
valid, operative phrase to convey fee title in land, and was in all 
likelihood the choice at the time the conveyance was made by Helm 
to the railroad. 
The district court refers to there "being imprecise legal 
description and other relevant language" (R. 235) as a basis for 
concluding there was a right-of-way. To clarify this rather 
ambiguous conclusion, which is not supported by proper findings, 
there arose during argument and witness examination much was made 
of the issue that warranties were absent from the indenture and 
therefore, absent warranties no valid conveyance was made. Also, 
the district court in its conclusions at R. 236, concluded that 
"Based upon the abandonment and the conditional language contained 
in the 1958 Special Warranty Deed from the Railroad Company to 
Building Supply Center regarding warranty and fence lines, no 
conveyance of the disputed strip of land actually occurred. We 
have dealt with the abandonment issue, but we wish to briefly 
address this point concerning warranty and fence language in the 
1958 deed. 
First, we submit that warranties are separate and apart from 
the conveyance itself and have nothing to do with the actual 
conveyance of the property. How the limited warranties in a Special 
Warranty Deed vitiates a title transfer is in no way explained by 
the district court and certainly is not supported by law or the 
facts. We refer the court to 26 CJS Deeds, Sec. 22 (e) at 628, 
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ft.-.-* '. :iay conta: . ilause of 
warranty and covenants or conventions, a t I s vaJ id without them, 
«"or * *.*--. ^
 iiV>t parts of the conveyance proper but rivf sppar.ite 
The words ur conveyance are not only present in the indenture 
from Helm ailroad, but r 3 
*-•::. .--58 deed fi .*. . :ie a.noac I i^^^m^ Supply 
Company, 
The second point concernn; 3 
language deed is enigmatic. That language siates: 
11
 Subject however to . outstanding rights for <n:\ and a' I ripe 
lines, fences : 
utility . . v. existing upon, under, along, over across scij 
described premises." When one goes through the testimony of the 
trial it • • i 
that du^ the presence Ji» + .. : fences m 'he deed, ^nc the 
deed being subject \r fences ' -i* -r he an admission *~ the 
existenr ;i 
boundary simply makes : sense t re ne 
case the railroad grantor would be making the property description 
subji • . - _. . ., 
also roads, ditches, pole and wire lines, pipe lines, utilities and 
other such objects. 
, Second , inn Mini I I in ilmil mli| i I I it lllenees ii. in ill a n 
acknowledgement that a fence line exists, iitie experts testifying 
for both sides stated that ~ general exception such as 1 I if 
19 
foregoing in a deed is common, is done for the protection of the 
grantor, and does not constitute an admission that any of the named 
exceptions actually exists. (T. 91; T. 160) 
POINT II; 
THE DEFENDANT LASSON DID NOT ACQUIRE TITLE TO THE DISPUTED 
PARCEL OF LAND BY ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Adverse possession is a means of establishing title and 
possession to land that is owned by another. It is just what it 
says it is, a possession and claim that is adverse to the rights of 
the true owner. If the person taking possession does so under some 
type of deed or other conveyance, this is termed taking under 
"color of title", although our courts have often not given 
substantial effect to possession under color of title. Since the 
defendant Lasson claims title to the disputed strip of land under 
a deed, it is necessary to discuss the ramifications of color of 
title on the defendant's claim. 
78-12-9 U.C.A. provides as follows: 
"For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any 
person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or 
a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed 
and occupied in the following cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial 
inclosure. 
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used 
for the supply of fuel, or fencing timber, for the 
purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for 
the ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly 
improved, the portion of such farm or lot that may 
have been left not cleared or not inclosed 
according to the usual course and custom of the 
adjoining county is deemed to have ben occupied for 
the same length of time as the part improved 
and cultivated." 
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Vi:+. jpen and notorious 
use, our Supreme Court has made it clear over the years thar trns 
requirement pertains equaJ ; ' code section i > 
thai, cui""' .-1 iii>FI where -.. ... claimed under coici ,.,; t.i 
The case of Day v. Steele, 184 P2d 218 (Utah 1947), at 220, made 
this clear when the court was confronted with 
adverse claimant purchased the land at a tax sa.e a,iu iidu an^ r-.-
a defective deed During the next ten years he p«id the tax*--
surveyed the land and established mark* rip^r^H Si i 
a water meter, replaced corner posts, and filled excavations. 1 
unanimous court said ve are of the opinion that respondents 
V l S a x r O ' - I 1 i i ' - t t i v . 'i "f1!"I a c 11 in I ! r i n M K "il i • II I! I 
11 Civ ti II in 1 . 1 mi . * *• - J, viiin 1. c:i J in, i 1 i i n II, I'll i cui f j 1/ I ' IOI n i mi II— j , 
open, notorious ond exclusive ff 
In the instant action the use made property by the 
d e f *-r:<"i •*' ' 
some trdx and weeds, and taken some stept « ..-. i part 
fencing of the property. Furthermore, the court s finding that tb> 
defer,/'i-r ^ . >.-. 
activities that constituted opei . continuous and notorious : 
•the property adverse >r 1 he true owner * •ota' * 
w i I I i i HI 1! 1 »ii 
found a I - ' existed, w» submit that the "fence" > 
constituted a "substantial inclosure" as required by law. We also 
"'"::1 " " I  I  I l l i i | I " " ' i i " ! | | | . i n
 ( | n s | imii 
<•• ffeho' i:. idcL did exist. The extent i the fence found is th-.t 
Lasson alone said he found a strip oi barbed wire and among the 
*1 
trash some unspecified number of burned pieces of wood that he 
interpreted to be fence posts. Their location was not specified. 
[One of Lasson's witnesses testified that there had been some old 
sheds burned in fire in the same area and these so called fence 
posts could just as well have been remnants from the burned sheds. 
(T. 137)] This is critical since Lasson!s testimony of fence 
evidence is not tied in to the physical location of the fence 
markings on the Coon & King survey. Other evidence of the 
existence of a fence available to the court was the fence line 
marking on the Coon & King survey. But that marking indication 
fails to state the type of fence, how long it had existed, who 
erected it, or why it was created. In point of fact, there is very 
little credible evidence that a fence of any type ever existed 
across the disputed tract, and certainly no evidence as to its 
history if it did exist. 
For argument's sake, even if we assume a fence existed, this 
alone would not satisfy the "substantial inclosure" requirement of 
the law. We refer the court to the case of Peterson v. Johnson, 34 
P2d 697, at 698 (Utah, 1934) where the court stated that: 
"The mere fact that the defendant's predecessors in title 
inclosed within his fence a strip of land not covered by 
his deed and that such fence has ben maintained for a long 
period of time does not vest title in such land in the 
defendant." 
In the case of Scott v. Hansen, 442 P2d 525 (Utah, 1966). our 
Supreme Court held that: 
"When land is held under color of title the possessory 
requirement for adverse possession may extend to the 
land described in the document providing the color 
of title, but only if the tract of land is an integrated 
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or unified tract under circumstances such that others would 
know that the claimant is claiming possession of the whole." 
Tliii cLij in tin., case, and frankly has been 
found LU -i* uniy t Ut arest of circumstances. This leaves us 
with the question ^4 * rio j il u p r n y 
C Eundamental conditions to establish adverse 
possession is occupancy of another's land in such a manner that the 
true owner who i s being adversed ill iverse 
C la i ip.-.in1 " "•  iiss" • ' "i1"! .. ' ' right Lu occupy, use and hold the land in 
question. Notice cannot be provided unless the land c- occupier L 
such a manner • »• — * . . ^he 
advei:siii<y p.-...
 taJ .. actions. 
In the casp before this coui * * -» defendants, ;iu w:i I I is 
others in * K-~ reighborhood atside ..I . >,-
tlispti Led • *.-w .4 jLihy i « asii a^ v. a tew unked vehicles. - simi, .: 
situation - ( be found \ the rase ot -.H. Peery Estate __„ 
151 P 59 (Utah ~e? made of the property 
cite essential;, ^ u U . ^ . i uose ot f fie instant action, - •• 
as a sinii larity with s .n > factual I ssi les in 
Peery the claimir. until Led to the land 
based upon certain surveys which he alleged supported his deed. 
The claiming party ajsc laimed tit! e I >: virtue < " 
possession and bounr . IIHSU'IUM '" Supreme Court found 
against the defendant on the boundary issue and turned i 
attention * adverse possession ' ^ which *,.--
part upon . * - ttom ieye-
descriptions which defendant asserted showed a surplus of L..J ^ 
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which defendant was entitled- There was also evidence that there 
may have been some burnt posts and possibly some wire fastened to 
the posts along the south end of the property. The court found 
that the fence was never intended to be a boundary nor was it 
recognized as such. However, the most telling facts concern the 
uses made of the strip of land by the adverse claimant. 
On the disputed strip in that case the claiming party had 
deposited old vehicles and trash, and as the court observed, " . . 
the defendant used not only the disputed strip, but also, and of 
necessity, so used additional, open, uninclosed and unoccupied 
ground to the south of the strip, which additional ground 
confessedly belonged to the plaintiff, and admittedly was not 
acquired adversely or otherwise by the defendant." (Ibid., at p. 
66) (We submit that these facts are substantially identical to 
those of the case before this court.) In finding that such a use 
was inadequate the Supreme Court stated and ruled as follows: 
"It is not uncommon for one neighbor to let vehicles stand on 
uninclosed and unoccupied ground of another, to lead or 
drive horses over it, and to throw manure and rubbish 
on it. All that may be a trespass or a nuisance; but it 
hardly is such a possession or occupancy as is calculated to 
give the owner notice of an adverse holding, and knowledge to 
him that, if he does not take steps to interrupt the 
occupancy, it will ripen into a title by limitation. * * * 
Hence the general rule that the possession of an adverse 
claimant must be continuous, exclusive, open, hostile, 
notorious, and of such character as to enable the owner 
to know of the invasion of his rights. I do not think the 
defendant's possession or occupancy or use of the strip 
was of that character." (Ibid., at 66) [Emphasis added] 
The absolute necessity of the adverse party conducting his 
occupancy in such a way that it gives notice to the true owner 
cannot be understated. The court in Scott, supra., at 529, stated 
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t : 
"If the rule were otherwise, landowners would 
be placed under the unduly burdensome necessity of 
periodically checking the property descriptions 
of their neighbors to see that some document had not 
been placed of record which encroached upon their 
land." 
T; •.:! second requirement to estabi /.• ti4:!4? by adverse 
possession concerns the payment of taxes for the requisite period 
of time of adverse occuparn ] III! I if n HI I SIP n f I I I i m l 
evidence was presented that the defendant Lasson had paid taxes ;i 
the propert : ; 7 Trans ut fTidt evidence was n^f 
clear && L 
intended, and . >ue^i.a showed paymenl of taxes : :>.-^ h i seven 
successive years which coincided w n -the alleged ope^ 
note 
Id-,. provides as follows: 
"In u<- case shall adverse possession be considered 
established under the provisions of any section of 
of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven 
years continuously, and that the party, his predecessors 
and grantors have paid all taxes which have been levied 
and assessed upon such land according to law." 
nnii in ' i i i i | | i i i i i i i 1 in ill I ! i n I 1 mi 111 i Hi,,! in I I i I » S U I 1 u t e 1 y 
essential that be shown fay the adverse claiman • bears the 
burden of proof, that \r*> taxes have been paid *f ^ v ^  ~ 
year Bowen v. UISOL, 
P2d ^ • •, ?OJ m m n , . ••>-* >, M *- > oir ruied as follows on the 
necessity __ timely payment of taxes: 
, [P]erhaps the most important consideration is 
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that one of the purposes of the statute requiring payment 
of taxes in order to establish adverse possession is that 
by paying taxes on the land a public record is made 
which gives notice to the owner that his land is being 
claimed adversely. This purpose cannot be fulfilled 
if the possessor can wait any number of years, even 
up to the necessary seven, and then pay the taxes in a 
lump sum by redeeming." 
The facts show that Lasson did not acquire the property until 
1993, short of the seven years, and no evidence was produced as to 
what taxes may have been levied by the county and paid by his 
predecessors in interest prior to his 1993 deed. Clearly, then, he 
fails as to both the possession and tax requirements imposed by law 
as necessary elements to establish title by adverse possession. 
POINT III: 
THE DEFENDANT LASSON FAILED TO ESTABLISH TITLE BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
While it is not entirely clear what role adverse possession or 
boundary by acquiescence played in the court's final ruling, it 
appears from the nature of some of the conclusions, as well as the 
factual emphasis on various subjects such as nature of occupation, 
continuity of use, the payment of taxes, fence lines, types of use, 
visible markers, periods of occupation, and other such topics that 
these legal principles did form a substantial basis for the court's 
final ruling. 
The elements that our appellate courts have established as the 
basis for resolving title through boundary by acquiescence are set 
forth in a variety of Utah cases, and we cite to the court as an 
example the case of Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P2d 417 (Utah 1990), 
wherein the components listed are: "(1) Occupation up to a visible 
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line marked by monuments/ fences, or buildings, (2) mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary/ (3) for a long period of 
time,. ( 4) I: s adjoinii ig 1 andowners " (Emphasis added) I : •. !:1: le Staker: 
case the occupation line was a readily isible and permanent fence 
line witl I the occupation itself consisting c:f houses, buildings, 
cm i J I:::! vate< 
In Goodman v. Wilkinson/ 629 P2d 447, - f 4r. . , — r 
court ruled that "failure to establish any one of the four elements 
is fatal to the defense of" boundar ^ b y acquiescence " ' (I'^ iphas ' • 
added) 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the meaning ' f rb<* -econd 
line. -jr. numerous occasions. 
In the case -r Madson v. Cleqq, 639 P2d 726 (Utah 1981), the 
"This Court has determined that Iii the absence 
of an express agreement as to the location of the 
boundary between adjoining owners, the law will 
imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, 
if it can do so consistently with the facts appearing. 
However, when the evidence fails to support any 
implication that a fence has been erected by 
adjoining owners pursuant to an agreement between 
them as to the location of the boundary, the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has no application." 
r, +^n ~r.^n i-\* Glen v. Whitney, 2u^ P2d ' • 
Utah Suprem -v 
11
 there must be some uncertainty or a dispute 
between adjoining owners as to the location of the 
true boundary line before a fence which they 
subsequently erect to resolve their differences 
and in which they acquiesce for a long period of time, 
may be taken as the agreed boundary line." 
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In all cases examined and cited herein, or otherwise available 
on this point, the appellate courts of this state require a 
substantial and highly visible marker to establish the line of 
demarcation between the parties. At best, the defendants have 
shown that a couple of burned posts in a rubbish pile, and a strand 
or two of wire were present. Under the fact situations of no case 
examined for this action have we found a boundary "marker" of this 
dignity in which a court would declare the parties have acquiesced. 
Furthermore, the dispute in the case over the location of the 
track line does not appear to support Lasson. He had but one 
witness who testified that he thought the track position had 
changed, but was not at all clear as to when, where or how. On the 
other hand, the 1910 affidavit from the railroad Engineer is much 
closer in time, and is based upon personal knowledge and 
observation. He, Mr. Blake, was quite certain as to the location 
of the track and the Drazich chain is based largely upon his 
knowledge. Other witnesses were likewise quite certain as to the 
location of the track. 
It is important that there first of all be an adequate 
boundary marker. Unless this is present it is virtually impossible 
for he court to determine that the parties have acquiesced in a 
boundary to that marker. In Florence v. Hiline Equipment Co., 581 
P2d 998 (Utah 1978), the court ruled that the parties must, by 
evidence, acquiesce that the fence is the boundary. In our case we 
have very minimal evidence of what might have been a fence, no 
evidence that any parties were aware of the fence, very little 
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evidence :: :i: characiei , i i\ true t ure i»i 1 Ita fence, and certain] y 
therefore* no evidence that anyone ever acquiesced uoundary to 
a definite and readily ascertainable point- There is thus evi dence 
lacking as +<*% fho purpose of th. f^npo who erected LL, I LS 
purpose, :i•>o it qot there, how long i existed, t whether there 
was real ' i s I i i n 1 1! 1 11 
Lasson " s grantor Lest, ^  : : thought there had been a 
"decrepit"1" c:>] ci fence : -f some type i n f he b u s h e s , nu • ; • -
d e s c r i p I: i 11 i: • f iii I: s q m :i :ii !:  s : a g i 1 a ( 111 1 
history or uses of the "fence.," 
The court Hales v, Frakes, f u d *sf (Utah 1Q79),
 rfr ^ 
r ' ' . . c 
marked definitely oy monuments, fences or buildings, 
should be noted that this case emphasized the necessity o^ having 
i i' :: I: c i iJ ] a 3ef3 i: id te iiaj : ke:i : bi i !:: occupatioi 
,: Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P2d 944 (Utah 1966), at ^4t\, < 
Supreme Court ruled that: 
"A claimed b o i m cj a ry line by a C q U i e s c e n c e must be 
open to observation. * * * A boundary line to 
be established by acquiescence must be definite, 
certain and not speculative." (Emphasis added) 
We submit that i n that case at bar we .have only a speculative 
boundary line, speculative even *' existence or phvsi rai 
char ac ter a i: » * whether anyone he 
chain of title ever knew ..: the terue c mutually recognized it is 
a boundary between the twc parcels of land for the requisite 
year period c: f t. i me. 
The fact situation in Fuoco is instructive on this point. In 
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that case there was a ditch used only for one tract for irrigation, 
it was in a disintegrating nature and frequently obscured by weeds. 
The court found the ditch did not rise to the dignity of a boundary 
marker under the law. The court noted that any number of ditches 
could cross a person's land for purposes other than a boundary 
marker. The same can be said for fences. Even with a finding of 
the existence of a fence, there is no evidence to support a finding 
that the fence constituted a mutually agreed upon boundary between 
the two tracts of land. 
One of the most recent cases is that of Van Dyke v. 
Chappell,818 P2d 1023 (Utah 1991), wherein the court ruled that 
there must be substantial use and mutual agreement to a definite 
and obvious point. The court made three important rulings. The 
substantial use, the mutual agreement and the existence of a 
definite and obvious point of boundary. The evidence in our case 
would seem to provide little support for any of the three elements 
required by the court in that case. 
We could cite many cases defining occupancy or use. The Van 
Dyke case cited above requires substantial use. In the instant 
action we have virtually no use. The testimony is that the area 
was used by the neighborhood, including some of the defendants, as 
a garbage dump, and one key witness for the defense testified that 
the trash was dumped beyond the alleged fence line. (T. 142) 
The need to make substantial use to a given point is critical 
so as to give notice to all parties concerned of the physical point 
to which a party claims title. Furthermore, we question whether 
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courts. We submit that iz does not, even if the trash being dumped 
was by the defendants alone and not bv thers in the neighborhood. 
In defining occupancy, the court -. urangstreet v. Auto-Owners 
Ins. Co., 536 NW :i 8- : .31 (Wise ) , I: .eld that: 
"Occupancy means LU Lake up residence in . . . , to reside 
in as owner or tenant; to take or enter upon possession 
of; to hold possession of; to hold or keep for use; to 
possess; to tenant; to do business in; to take or 
hold possession. Actual use, possession and cultivation." 
P : . " ,f' -• l >> * .-. 1 I 
Peterson v. Johnson, \ i ..w o (Utah 
1934), the court was dealing with a situation where there was a 
i - : • • ' - -iMmw: : •*• j o n cstafc : -'-"*". •:i 1: i,; :: fence, I: -\ :: t 
essentially :i= • use ox i. ht-r .-dud... The court held as follows: 
"The mere fact that the defendants predecessors 
in title inclosed within his fence a strip of land 
not covered by his deed and that such fence had 
been maintained for a long period of time does 
not vest title in, such land in the defendant " 
After considerable wrangling by the parties, this cou rt has 
i r - I:] , pe a I: s Dm a ti me I:: \ l I: th =sii : e 
is cieariy no i inding of mutual acquiescence, or til: l a t: the fence was 
oi a substantial nature, ::>n : 1 low ] ong i t existed. And the nature of 
t • . . . "] ;;l? ::i i isii i f f i c:i e i i t HIS d e l i u e d ijimul i t 'lju i i *»d b y 
law. We propose, therefore, that not * JJ ie of the four elements has 
been established, and the failure of any one is fatal to the claim 
o 1 I In11 tit1.1 t i i idai i 1 I.ak»MHI , 
POINT I V : 
THE MARKETABLE TITLE ACT DOES NOT ACT TO DIVEST THE 
PLAINTIFF DRAZICH OF HIS PROPERTY, NOR DOES IT ACT TO QUIET 
J JL 
TITLE TO THE DISPUTED TRACT IN THE NAME OF THE DEFENDANT 
LASSON. 
The "Marketable Title Act" is set forth in 57-9-1, et. seq., 
U.C.A., a complete copy of which is included in the addendum to 
this brief. The defendant Lasson and the district court placed 
considerable emphasis on this statute to support the award and 
judgment to Lasson. In Lassonfs trial brief (R. 112) the 
arguments made by him condense down essentially to a claim that 
they have a 40 year chain of title which is supposedly unbroken and 
therefore Lasson is entitled to have title quieted in his name. 
The defendant Lasson seems to confuse the issues of adverse 
possession with the Marketable Title Act. The Marketable Title Act 
has nothing to do with adverse possession, but is instead a means 
used to perfect title against claims that arose prior to the root 
of title, as that root is established by the statute. To prevail 
the title holder must have an unbroken record chain of title for at 
least 40 ears plus such period of time as may be necessary to find 
the next fee simple conveyance. You may then ignore any claims 
behind that root but you are charged with notice of any conveyance 
since the root. 
For Lasson to benefit from the Marketable Title Act he must 
show an unbroken record chain, as well as nothing that purports to 
divest any interest in his chain. In this case we have two 
independent chains of title that on their face would appear to be 
marketable. 
The facts are clear that the railroad owned fee title to the 
subject tract, and not a mere right-of-way. Thus, fee title was 
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I /eyance . - . .-. . ^P^—y 
Company. The Marketable Title Act list' five (r ) exceptions to the 
act, number four I-1 I being r± qreates^ impor* to our case. it 
stales 111 H"" t1 h e I. a h 1 v i . sub j ect to: . . 
"Any interest arising out of a til ,le transaction which has 
been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root 
of title from which the unbroken chain of title of record is 
started; provided, however, that such recording shall not 
revive or give validity to any interest which has been 
extinguished prior to the time of the recording by the 
operation of Section S7-9-* 
The 
to tl le defendant's xouL ol title. (See Exhibits 15-P and 16- r 
From that date we have a number of conveyances, witri the plaintiffs 
beii . 
durii,^ ii.. - period . •- «.i- i. trien that a ' these 
conveyances interrupt the title rha - of defendants ^^ 
defpi'-*'-
creates c% parallel, independent chain * title that the Marketable 
Title A* designed s resolve. 
Robert Swenson ui LL«- faculty or i\n university * >:. College 
of Law, i"i in ni 1,1;," regarding exceptic-i .- number four tbrv . . . a 
iiif'i i kij f" -ril'i I "i i pet - ransacti on,. 
recorded within forty years alter the recording of the root nf 
title even though such instrument
 pi.s outside the record chain ul_ 
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title," (Emphasis added) 
The "Title Standards of the Utah State Bar" concerning the 
Marketable Title Act are instructive and helpful on these issues. 
Standard No. 45 states that "The Marketable Title Act is remedial 
in character and should be relied upon as a cure or remedy for such 
imperfections of title as fall within its scope." The effect of 
the act is limited and clearly the facts of this case do not fall 
within its scope. 
Even more in point is standard No. 54, which states that: 
"The recording of an instrument of conveyance subsequent to 
the effective date of the root of title has the same effect 
in preserving any interest conveyed as the filing of the 
notice provided for in Sec. 4 of the ct. See Utah Code Ann. 
57-9-2(4) (1953). (Emphasis added) 
The comment provides additional clarification. In part, it 
states at the outset that "This standard is operative both where 
there are claims under a single chain of title and where there are 
two or more independent chains of title." (Emphasis added) 
We therefore submit that with the many conveyances of record 
since Lasson's root of title, coupled with the fee ownership of the 
railroad, the Marketable Title Act simply avails neither party 
anything. If Lasson can claim that it cures the defects in his 
chain, then Drazich can make the same claim as to his chain, both 
of which are independent of the other. 
One final question remains, for which we have been unable to 
find any answer or any supporting authority in either direction. 
If the overlap has been caused because of the change in 
descriptions made in the 1950 deed from Stanley Eastman to Glen 
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tap1" aoroken chain, ana, does it give 
him a i >aa *. ' tie requisite period under the Marketable 
Title Act? These questions presently have i IC a 1:1s / HE i • 
CONCLUSION 
We have attempted to marshal1 the evidence that the court had 
available * * ^  decision. Appellant tiikt:'-Si I h* |n •, i I iiiiii II ml 
tlii _ t support the courtfs decisions where facts 
are required, that the appellee Lasson has failed carry his 
burden - * proof i i 1 the -se i ns tances wher e :ii It: :ii s i: = .• ji 
the a . court has misapplied the law i n those instances where 
the law is controlling. 
Qn £^e ^ gsue Q ,| || n(|| j }|( } ! i|(l |, , , | ( f (! li. V t I | II ( i I II II II 1. 1 J I j d I II II , " i f II II 
and convey to a par ny o successors and assigns " forever in fe»j" 
can by no stretch ' tho imagination be interpreted t^ convey only 
d J.1T i * ! • - _ " 
subject to abandonment Nothing else the record furnishes <.: 
factual grounds for the. court to have concluded *K-* — *~ - • -niteu 
est a t .. - - :::a,i l ::)i mJ j ::::(:)i i< i-.. ^ * . a w»<? 
held tuioad and could not be abandoned. 
The appellee Lasson stipulated * court that record titl e v\ •  = s 
held h\ " ilii111 a p p a l i.url Il| i . w, i 1 • 11 "' • . showing 
that title by adverse possession was acquired by Lasson rests upon 
him. The facts do nor support his contention. There is no shown ng 
paymen s a an year s, and whether we ] ook at tl le 
case from the perspective of simple adverse possession adverse 
possession under color of title, we cannot find fat III". a 
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holding that Lasson acquired title by adverse possession. 
As to boundary by acquiescence, again the burden of proof lies 
upon Lasson. Even at best, he had only one witness who testified 
of seeing an old fence of some sort in the brush. No one else saw 
this fence. Only Lasson found a strand or two of wire, and some 
burned posts amongst rubbish that he said "could" have been fence 
posts. But does this constitute a substantial inclosure for the 
purposes of adverse possession, or, a clear line to which parties 
mutually acquiesce for purposes of boundary by acquiescence? We 
cannot say that it does for either purpose. Indeed, in viewing the 
court decisions extant on these legal principles, we can only 
conclude that the whole fence line issue has been greatly blown out 
of proportion and that the so called "fence" does not in any way 
meet the criteria to satisfy the legal requirements under either 
legal doctrine. 
The uses made of the property furnish even less support for 
the Lasson position than the fence. The property was a waste dump 
for years, if not decades. Clearly, Lassonfs claims of substantial 
uses of the property do not square with any facts presented to the 
court. 
Finally, the Marketable Title Act. Here we have Lasson 
attempting to bootstrap himself into title due to his predecessors' 
changing of the method they described the property they had granted 
to them. When Stanley Eastman granted to Grant Eastman the 
evidence was uncontroverted that it was due to the change of 
description in that conveyance that the overlap of the two 
36 
properties occurred. Say what anyone might, the railroad's 
position and property description had long been established, and in 
the Lasson chain of title the call had always been to the center 
line of the tracks. Suddenly we have a completely different change 
of description with the admitted result the legal descriptions of 
the properties then overlapped. Lassonfs witness Arlen Taylor said 
that the descriptions before and after were "fairly similar." This 
cannot suffice. One can only convey what one owns and "fairly 
similar" descriptions of land cannot be used as a legitimate basis 
to claim title to land. 
The Marketable Title Act does not afford protection in such a 
situation, nor does it provide relief to people in a parallel chain 
of title, jif the Lasson chain can really even be called parallel 
due the different descriptions used. Thus, this act affording no 
protection Lasson must prevail on one of the others points, and 
there being no supportable law or facts there his claims to the 
property in dispute, we submit, must be denied and the decision of 
the district court should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /cS ^dav of September, 1997. 
801-521-8220 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to David 
P. Hirschi, attorney for appellee Lasson, 2224 North 640 West, West 
Bountiful, Utah, 84087, on the j / / ^ / 7 ! day of September, 1997. 
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ADDENDUM 
STATUTES: (All references to Utah Code Annotated) 
57-9-1 
57-9-2 
57-9-3 
78-2a-3 
78-12-7 
78-12-8 
78-12-9 
78-12-10 
78-12-11 
78-12-12 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
57-8-35 REAL ESTATE 
declaration and bylaws adopted pursuant to the provisions of 
this act. 
(2) All agreements, decisions and determinations lawfully 
made by the manager, management committee or by the 
association of unit owners in accordance with this act, the 
declaration or bylaws, shall be deemed to be binding on all 
unit owners. 1963 
57-8-35. Effect of o ther laws — Compliance wi th ordi-
nances and codes — Approval of projects by 
munic ipal i ty or county. 
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall be in addition and 
supplemental to all other provisions of law, statutory or 
judicially declared, provided that wherever the application of 
the provisions of this chapter conflict with the application of 
such other provisions, this chapter shall prevail: provided 
further, for purposes of Sections 10-9-805, 10-9-811, and 
17-27-804 and provisions of similar import and any law or 
ordinance adopted pursuant thereto, a condominium project 
shall be considered to be a subdivision, and a record of survey 
map or supplement thereto prepared pursuant to this chapter 
shall be considered to be a subdivision map or plat, only with 
respect to: 
(a) such real property or improvements, if any, as are 
intended to be dedicated to the use of the public in 
connection with the creation of the condominium project 
or portion thereof concerned; and 
(b) those units, if any, included in the condominium 
project or portion thereof concerned which are not con-
tained in existing or proposed buildings. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to state or 
imply tha t a condominium project, unit, association or unit 
owners, or management committee is exempt by this chapter 
from compliance with the zoning ordinance, building and 
sanitary codes, and similar development regulations which 
have been adopted by a municipality or county. No condo-
minium project or any use within said project or any unit or 
parcel or parcel of land indicated as a separate unit or any 
structure within said project shall be permitted which is not in 
compliance with said ordinances and codes. 
(3) From and after the time a municipality or county shall 
have established a planning commission, no condominium 
project or any record of survey map, declaration, or other 
material as required for recordation under this chapter shall 
be recorded in the office of the county recorder unless and until 
the following mentioned attributes of said condominium 
project shall have been approved by the municipality or 
county in which it is located. In order to more fully avail itself 
of this power, the legislative body of a municipality or county 
may provide by ordinance for the approval of condominium 
projects proposed within its limits. This ordinance may in-
clude and shall be limited to a procedure for approval of 
condominium projects, the standards and the criteria for the 
geographical layout of a condominium project, facilities for 
utility lines and roads which shall be constructed, the percent-
age of the project which must be devoted to common or 
recreational use, and the content of the declaration with 
respect to the s tandards which must be adhered to concerning 
maintenance, upkeep, and operation of any roads, utility 
facilities, recreational areas, and open spaces included in the 
project. 
(4) Any ordinance adopted by the legislative body of a 
municipality or county which outlines the procedures for 
approval of a condominium project shall provide for: 
(a) a preliminary approval, which, among other things, 
will then authorize the developer of the condominium 
project to proceed with the project; and 
(b) a final approval which will certify that all of the 
requirements set forth in the preliminary approval either 
have been accomplished or have been assured of accom-
plishment by bond or other appropriate means. No ( 
ration or record of survey map shall be recorded i 
office of the county recorder until a final approva 
been granted. 
57-8-36. Exist ing p r o j e c t s — Effect of statutory am 
ments . 
Any condominium project established by instruments 
for record prior to the effective date of the foregoing an 
ments to the Condominium Ownership Act (hereinaftc 
ferred to as an "existing project") and the rights and ol 
tions of all parties interested in any such existing pj 
shall, to the extent that the declaration, bylaws, and reo 
survey map concerning the existing project are inconsi 
with the provisions of these amendments, be governec 
controlled by the provisions of the Condominium Owne 
Act as they existed prior to these amendments and b 
terms of the existing project's declaration, bylaws, and r 
of survey map to the extent that these terms are cons' 
with applicable law other than these amendments. Any 
ing project containing or purporting to contain time j 
units, convertible land, or convertible space, any ex 
project which is or purports to be a contractible, expam 
or leasehold condominium, the validity of any such pi 
and the validity and enforceability of any provisions cor 
ing time period units, convertible land, convertible s-
withdrawable land, additional land, or leased land whic 
set forth in an existing project's declaration, bylaws, or i 
of survey map, shall be governed by applicable law in 
prior to these amendments, including principles relati 
reasonableness, certainty, and constructive and actual r 
shall not necessarily be ineffective or defeated in whole 
part because the project or provision in question doe 
comply or substantially comply with those requirements 
foregoing amendments which would have been applicabl 
the instruments creating the project been recorded aft< 
effective date of these amendments, but shall, in any eve 
valid, effective, and enforceable if the project or provis 
question either substantially complies with those re 
ments of the foregoing amendments which relate t 
subject at issue or employs an arrangement which sul 
tially achieves the same policy as underlies those re 
ments of the foregoing amendments which relate t 
subject at issue. 
CHAPTER 9 
MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE 
Section 
57-9-1. What constitutes marketable record title. 
57-9-2. Rights and interests to which marketable i 
title is subject. 
57-9-3. Marketable record title held free and cl< 
interests, claims, and charges. 
57-9-4. Filing of notice of claim of interest authori. 
Effect of possession of land by record ow 
possessory interest. 
57-9-5. Notice of claim of interest — Contents — 
for record. 
57-9-6. Applicability of provisions. 
57-9-7. Existing s tatutes of limitations and rec< 
statutes not affected. 
57-9-8. Definitions. 
57-9-9. Legislative purpose and construction. 
57-9-10. Extension of limitation period. 
57-9-1. What const i tutes marketable record tit le 
Any person having the legal capacity to own land i 
state, who has an unbroken chain of title of record i 
•m 
REAL ESTATE 57-9-6 
•*«• rest in land for forty years or more, shall be deemed to 
^ T g marketable record title to such interest as defined in 
ijfvjon 57.9-8, subject only to the matters stated in Section 
ffo-2. A person shall be deemed to have such an unbroken 
jTin of ^ e w n e n ^n e official public records disclose a 
frtycyance or other title transaction, of record not less than 
? JL years at the time the marketability is to be determined, 
hich said conveyance or other title transaction purports to 
--ate such interest, either in 
^ ^ (1) the person claiming such interest or 
(2) some other person from whom, by one or more 
conveyances or other title transactions of record, such 
purported interest has become vested in the person claim-
ing such interest: with nothing appearing of record, in 
either case, purporting to divest such claimant of such 
purported interest. 1963 
57 9-2. R igh t s and i n t e r e s t s to which marketable 
* record title is subject. 
The marketable record title is subject to: 
(1) all interests and defects which are inherent in the 
muniments of which such chain of record title is formed, 
except that a general reference in the muniments or any 
of them, to easements, use restrictions, or other interests 
created prior to the root of title is not sufficient to preserve 
them, unless specific identification is made therein of a 
recorded title transaction which creates the easement, 
use restriction, or other interest; 
(2) all interests preserved by the filing of proper notice 
or by possession by the same owner continuously for a 
period of 40 years or more, in accordance with Section 
57-9-4; 
(3) the rights of any person arising from prescriptive 
use or a period of adverse possession or user, which was in 
whole or in part subsequent to the effective date of the 
root of title; 
(4) any interest arising out of a title transaction which 
has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the 
root of title from which the unbroken chain of title of 
record is started, except that the recording does not revive 
or give validity to any interest which has been extin-
guished prior to the time of the recording by the operation 
of Section 57-9-3; and 
(5) the exceptions stated in Section 57-9-6 as to rights 
of reversioners in leases, as to apparent easements and 
interests in the nature of easements, as to the right, title, 
or interests of the state in school or institutional trust 
lands, and as to interests of the United States. 1995 
57-9-3. M a r k e t a b l e r e c o r d t i t l e he ld free and c l e a r of 
interests, claims, and charges. 
Subject to Sections 57-9-2 and 57-9-6: 
(1) the marketable record title shall be held by its 
owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the 
land free and clear of all interests, claims, or charges, 
whatsoever, the existence of which depends upon any act, 
transaction, event, or omission that occurred prior to the 
effective date of the root of title; and 
(2) all such interests, claims, or charges, however de-
nominated, whether legal or equitable, present or future, 
whether the interests, claims, or charges are asserted by 
a person sui juris or under a disability, whether the 
person is within or without the state, whether the person 
is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are 
declared to be void. 1995 
57-9-4. F i l ing of no t i c e of c la im of i n t e r e s t authorized 
— Effect of possess ion of land by r e c o r d 
owner of possessory interest. 
(1) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve 
*nd keep effective such interest by filing for record during the 
forty-year period immediately following the effective date of 
the root of title of the person whose record title would 
otherwise be marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by 
oath, setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack 
of knowledge of any kind on the part of anyone shall suspend 
the running of the forty-year period. The notice may be filed 
for record by the claimant or by any other person acting in 
behalf of any claimant who is 
(a) under a disability, 
(b) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or 
(c) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be estab-
lished or is uncertain at the time of filing the notice of 
claim for record. 
(2) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in 
land has been in possession of such land continuously for a 
period of forty years or more, during which period no title 
transaction with respect to such interest appears of record in 
his chain of title, and no notice has been filed by him or on his 
behalf as provided in Subsection (1), and such possession 
continues to the time when marketability is being determined, 
such period of possession shall be deemed equivalent to the 
filing of the notice immediately preceding the termination of 
the forty-year period described in Subsection (1). 1963 
57-9-5. Notice of claim of interest — Contents — Filing 
for record. 
Tb be effective and to be entitled to record, the notice 
referred to above shall contain an accurate and full description 
of all land affected by such notice which description shall be 
set forth in particular terms and not by general inclusions; but 
if the claim is founded upon a recorded instrument, then the 
description in the notice may be the same as tha t contained in 
the recorded instrument. The notice shall be filed for record in 
the registry of deeds of the county or counties where the land 
described therein is situated. The recorder of each county shall 
accept all such notices presented to him which describe land 
located in the county in which he serves and shall enter and 
record full copies thereof in the same way that deeds and other 
instruments are recorded and each recorder shall be entitled 
to charge the same fees for the recording thereof as are 
charged for recording deeds. In indexing the notices in his 
office each recorder shall enter the notices under the grantee 
indexes of deeds under the names of the claimants appearing 
in the notices. Such notices shall also be indexed under the 
description of the real estate involved in a book set apart for 
that purpose to be known as the "Notice Index.* 1963 
57-9-6. Appl icab i l i ty of p rov i s ions . 
This act may not be applied to bar: 
(1) any lessor or his successor as a reversioner of his 
right to possession on the expiration of any lease; or 
(2) extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of 
an easement created or held for any pipeline, highway, 
railroad or public utility purpose, or any easement or 
interest in the nature of an easement, the existence of 
which is clearly observable by physical evidence of its use; 
or 
(3) extinguish any water rights, whether evidenced by 
decrees, by certificates of appropriation, by diligence 
claims to the use of surface or underground water or by 
water users* claims filed in general determination pro-
ceedings; or 
(4) extinguish any right, title, estate, or interest in and 
to minerals, and any development, mining, production or 
other rights or easements related to the minerals or 
exercisable in connection with the minerals; or 
(5) any right, title, or interest of the state in school or 
institutional trust lands; or 
(6) any right, title, or interest of the United States, by 
reason of failure to file the notice herein required. 1995 
(w|r JUDICIAL CODE 78-3-4 
^^w-presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
1^5?judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
*- *j£ addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
# k , t h e presiding judge shall: 
#*/?) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
1
 /u) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
J v ^ l and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
iiials; and1 
^jncarry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
** the Judicial Council. 
^Filing fees *°r *ne Court of Appeals are the same as for 
.Supreme Court. 1988 
i* Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
n S e Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
rdmary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
2) Ike Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
juriadiction of interlocutory appeals; over: (a) ftf*e final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
judicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
lion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Irust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
« , (ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
* 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
ig) Appeals from the orders pn petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
a
^
nt
» Property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
Wpption, and paternity; 
,4) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
»jAJ) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
*ne Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
JWctfour judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
•or original appellate review and determination any 
^T^er which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jt^fj? JP0.urt °f Appeals shall comply with the require-
»teits • 6 3 , C n a P t e r 4 6 D » Administrative Procedures 
% *« J e v i e w °f agency adjudicative proceedings. 1996 
S5Li t f fu i e W ° f a c t i o n s b y Supreme Court. 
i 3 ^ 5 ^ e Judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
S S c o T ** y Po t ion for writ of certiorari to the 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1986 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals. 
78-3-5. Repealed. 
78-3-6. Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative System. 
78-3-12. Repealed. 
78-3-12.5. Costs of system. 
78-3-13. Repealed. 
78-3-13.4. Transfer of court operating responsibilities — 
Facilities — Staff — Budget. 
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed. 
78-3-14.2. District court case management. 
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures. 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. 
78-3-18. 
78-3-19. 
78-3-20. 
78-3-21. 
78-3-21.5. 
78-3-22. 
78-3-23. 
78-3-24. 
78-3-25. 
78-3-26. 
78-3-27. 
78-3-28. 
78-3-29. 
78-3-30. 
78-3-31. 
Application of savings accruing to counties. 
Judicial Administration Act — Short title. 
Purpose of act. * 
Definitions. 
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Terms and election — Responsibilities — 
Reports. 
Data bases for judicial boards. 
Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties. 
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Salary. 
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and 
responsibilities. 
Assistants for administrator of the courts — 
Appointment of trial court executives. 
Courts to provide information and statistical 
data to administrator of the courts. 
Annual judicial conference. 
Repealed. 
Presiding judge —Associate presiding judge — 
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers 
— Duties. 
Duties of the clerk of the district court. 
Court commissioners — Qualifications — Ap-
pointment — Functions governed by rule. 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 1971,1981, 1988 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office for judges of the district courts is six years, and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. 1988 
78-3-4. Jurisdict ion — Appeals . 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law. 
78-12-7 JUDICIAL CODE 462 
of the same, shall be effectual, unless it appears that the 
person prosecuting the action, or interposing the defense or 
counterclaim, or under whose title the action is prosecuted or 
defense or counterclaim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor 
or grantor of such person was seized or possessed of the 
property in question within seven years before the committing 
of the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted or 
defense or counterclaim made. 1963 
78-12-7. Adverse possession — Possession presumed in 
owner. 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the 
possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the 
property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof 
within the time required by law; and the occupation of the 
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been 
under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears 
that the property has been held and possessed adversely to 
such legal title for seven years before the commencement of 
the action. 1953 
78-12-7.1. Adverse possession — Presumption — Pro-
viso — Tax title. 
In every action for the recovery or possession of real prop-
erty or to quiet title to or determine the owner thereof the 
person establishing a legal title to such property shall be 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time 
required by law; and the occupation of such property by any 
other person shall be deemed to have been under and in 
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that such 
property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal 
title for seven years before the commencement of such action. 
Provided, however, that if in any action any party shall 
establish prima facie evidence that he is the owner of any real 
property under a tax title held by him and his predecessors for 
four years prior to the commencement of such action and one 
year after the effective date of this amendment he shall be 
presumed to be the owner of such property by adverse posses-
sion unless it appears that the owner of the legal title or his 
predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of 
such property under such title or that such tax title owner and 
his predecessors have failed to pay all the taxes levied or 
assessed upon such property within such four-year period. 
1963 
78-12-8. Under written instrument or judgment* 
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under 
whom he claims, entered into possession of the property under 
claim of title, exclusive of other right, founding such claim 
upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of the 
property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a 
competent court, and that there has been a continued occupa-
tion and possession of the property included in such instru-
ment, decree or judgment, or of some part of the property 
under such claim, for seven years, the property so included is 
deemed to have been held adversely, except that when the 
property so included consists of a tract divided into lots, the 
possession of one lot is not deemed a possession of any other 
lot of the same tract. 1963 
78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under 
written instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by 
any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument 
or a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been pos-
sessed and occupied in the following cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclo-
sure. 
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for 
the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber, for the purpose of 
husbandry, or for pasturage or for the ordinary use of the 
occupant. 
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly 
improved, the portion of such farm or lot tha t may have 
been left not cleared or not inclosed according to the usual 
course and custom of the adjoining county is deemed to 
have been occupied for the same length of time as the part 
improved and cultivated. 1963 
78-12-10. U n d e r c la im not founded on wri t ten instru-
ment or judgment. 
Where it appears tha t there has been an actual continued 
occupation of land under claim of title, exclusive of any other 
right, but not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or 
decree, the land so actually occupied, and no other, is deemed 
to have been held adversely. 1963 
78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not un-
der written instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a 
person claiming title, not founded upon a written instrument, 
judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed 
and occupied in the following cases only: 
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclo-
sure. 
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon 
dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for 
the purpose of irrigating such lands amounting to the sum 
of $5 per acre. 1963 
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes 
paid. 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered estab-
lished under the provisions of any section of this code, unless 
it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed 
for the period of seven years continuously, and that the party, 
his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
1963 
78-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes — Proviso 
— Tax title. 
In no case shall adverse possession be established under the 
provisions of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years 
continuously, and tha t the party,' his predecessors and grant-
ors have paid all the taxes which have been levied and 
assessed upon such land according to law. Provided, however, 
tha t payment by the holder of a tax title to real property or his 
predecessors, of all the taxes levied and assessed upon such 
real property after the delinquent tax sale or transfer under 
which he claims for a period of not less than four years and for 
not less than one year after the effective date of this amend-
ment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this 
section in regard to the payment of taxes necessary to estab-
lish adverse possession. 1963 
78-12-13. Adverse possess ion of publ ic s treets or w a y * 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or 
to any lands held by any town, city or county, or the corporate 
authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets, lanes, 
avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any other 
public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of 
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such 
town or city or county or the corporate authorities thereof have 
sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to 
a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and tha t for more 
than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the pur* 
chafer, his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the 
exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such real 
estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired. l*53 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. DRAZICH, a/k/a LOUISE 
ANN DRAZICH, as an individual, and 
LOUISE A DRAZICH as Trustee of 
Trusts created by the Will of ! 
MARKO N. DRAZICH, deceased, 1 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ALAN LASSON, an individual, ] 
MARY D. WHITE, an individual, 
DARRELL L. WHITE, an individual, 
and DAVID A. WHITE, an individual ' 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 940906967- PR 
) Judge: William B. Bohling 
This case came on for trial to this Court, pursuant to notice, 
on September 26, September 27, and November 13, 1996. Plaintiff 
and Defendant were represented by counsel and were given a full 
opportunity to present their respective arguments on the issues 
raised in the case. Evidence, testimony and arguments of the 
parties were presented and received for an in behalf of the 
respective parties. Based thereon, the Court being thus fully 
advised in the premises, does hereby make and enter the following: 
RED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 6 1996 
SAU LA^p3uNTY 
By Cv^C^U^f 
Deputy Clerk 
M62S1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Alan Lasson acquired title by Warranty Deed on 
October 25, 1993, to a parcel of land (the "Lasson Property") 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, described as follows: 
Commencing 4.7 chains South and 19.62 chains West from the 
East quarter corner, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 3.08 chains; 
thence South 45 deg. West 1.42 chains; thence North 4.15 
chains; thence East 1.13 chains to the point of beginning. 
2. Plaintiff acquired title by Warranty Deed dated December, 
1993, to a parcel of land which comprises approximately one (1) 
acre (Exhibit 1-P) . 
3. The description contained in the deed to Plaintiff 
overlaps and extends into the Lasson Property to the extent of 
approximately 11 feet at the easterly end and 20 feet at the 
westerly end, for an average width of approximately 15 feet. The 
precise description of said conflict is not identified by metes and 
bounds description. 
4. Title to the area in dispute has a common origin of title 
by virtue of a Patent issued by the United States Government in 
favor of James Bell, which appears of record in the official 
records of Salt Lake County, Utah (Exhibit 15-P). 
5. The Patentee, James Bell, conveyed fee title to Abraham 
Helm by a certain "Indenture" recorded in Book L, page 283-284, of 
the official records of Salt Lake County, Utah (Exhibit 15-P). 
6. Abraham Helm, by a certain "Indenture" dated August 29, 
1882, conveyed to The Denver and Rio Grande Railway Company (the 
2 
000232 
"Railroad Company") an interest in a strip of land which extended 
from the main line of the Railroad Company's railroad tracks, in a 
northeasterly direction, over and across the lands owned by Helm. 
The description contained in said Indenture describes the land to 
which the interest related as being a corridor two (2) rods (33 
feet) in width, lying 16 1/2 feet on either side of the center line 
of an existing railroad track, which area includes the area in 
dispute in the instant case. 
7. The railroad tracks lying within the corridor were removed 
in approximately 1904, and no precise legal description of the 
location of the tracks or of the corridor in which the tracks were 
located was ever recorded. Credible evidence at trial demonstrated 
considerable discrepancy and confusion as to the exact location of 
the Railroad Company tracks and that there may have been a shift in 
the location of the tracks prior to the tracks being removed in 
1904. 
8. The Railroad Company ceased paying taxes on the corridor 
lands in 1904, ceased using the land for railroad purposes at that 
time, and commenced quit claiming its interest in the corridor 
lands as early as 1926. 
9. In 1958, the Railroad Company employed Coon and King 
Engineers to attempt to survey the corridor of land upon which the 
tracks had existed and to establish a legal description for the 
corridor which had been imprecisely described in the 1882 
Indenture. 
3 
10. The survey prepared by Coon and King Engineers revealed 
the existence and location of a fence lying several feet south of 
what Coon and King believed to be the northerly boundary of the 
historic railroad right-of-way. No clear evidence was presented at 
trial demonstrating that the Coon and King survey accurately 
reflected the historic location of the Railroad Company tracks or 
the corridor through which they travelled. The location of the 
fence and evidence of its long term existence evidences that the 
fence may have been built along the northerly boundary of the 
Railroad Company right-of-way. 
11. Based upon the Coon and King survey, on September 3, 
1958, the Railroad Company issued a Special Warranty Deed to 
Building Supply Center, which was recorded in the official records 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, on November 26, 1958 (Exhibit 2-P).. The 
legal description contained in the Special Warranty Deed 
incorporates the parcel of land which is in dispute in the case at 
bar. 
12. The Special Warranty Deed contained exceptions and 
conditions, one of which being the "...outstanding rights for any 
and all...fences...now existing upon, under, along, over or across 
the described premises." 
13. The legal description contained in Plaintiff's deed dated 
December, 1993, contained that portion of the land described in the 
1958 Special Warranty Deed which is in dispute in the case at bar. 
14. The legal description contained in Defendant's Warranty 
Deed dated October 25, 1993, also covers the entire area in 
4 
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dispute, and said legal description has been consistently and 
continuously used in conveyances of the Lasson Property since at 
least 1950. 
15. Defendant and his predecessors in interest have used and 
occupied the real property described in Defendant's Warranty Deed 
since at least 1950. 
16. Neither Plaintiff nor any of Plaintiff's predecessors in 
interest have used or occupied any portion of the property in 
dispute since at least 1950. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant Alan Lasson is the owner of record in fee simple 
of the lands and premises which are the subject of this dispute in 
accordance with the legal description contained in the Warranty 
Deed dated October 25, 1993, recorded October 26, 1993, as Entry 
No. 5638344, in the official records of the Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Recorder. 
2 . Due to the imprecise legal description and other relevant 
language contained in the 1882 Indenture between Abraham Helm and 
the Railroad Company, the interest granted to the Railroad Company 
in 1882 was a grant of a right-of-way only, subject to abandonment. 
3. Based upon its actions and inactions relative to its 
5 
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right-of-way, the Railroad Company abandoned its right-of-way at 
some time prior to 1958. 
4. Based upon the abandonment and the conditional language 
contained in the 1958 Special Warranty Deed from the Railroad 
Company to Building Supply Center regarding warranty and fence 
lines, no conveyance of the disputed strip of land actually 
occurred. 
5. No "title transaction," as that term is used in Section 
57-9-2(4) of the Utah Marketable Record Title Act (Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 57-9-1 et, seq.) occurred so as to break 
Defendant's chain of title which has existed in excess of the forty 
(40) years required by Section 57-9-1 of the Utah Marketable Record 
Title Act. 
6. Defendant Alan Lasson is entitled to a Decree awarding 
said Defendant possession and right to possession of the premises 
hereinafter described and is entitled to a Decree and Judgment 
quieting title in said premises as against said Plaintiff and all 
persons claiming by, through and under said Plaintiff, and said 
Plaintiff should be enjoined, debarred and restrained from claiming 
or asserting any right, title, interest or estate in and to the 
premises belonging to Defendant, situate in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and described as follows: 
Commencing 4.7 chains South and 19.62 chains West from 
the East quarter corner, Section 1, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
3.08 chains; thence South 45 deg. West 1.42 chains; thence 
North 4.15 chains; thence East 1.13 chains to the point 
of beginning. 
6 
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7. The counterclaim of Defendant for trespass is dismissed, 
with prejudice. 
8. Defendant is entitled to costs incurred. Each party shall 
bear their own attorneyfs fees. 
DATED this 2L. day of MAJ^iiJUl ., 1996 
BY THp COURT / •x',..'^o\ 
W I L L I A M B . BOtffciji^'^"^'; 
District Courfe->#u5qeV'^ -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this JS~ day of November, 1996, I 
personally delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to: 
Brant H. Wall, Esq. 
Wall and Wall 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 800, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DAVID P< MRS, 
L\Lass2.fin 
8f^£:i$ 
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Attorney at Law 
2224 North 640 West 
West Bountiful, Utah 84087 
Telephone: (801) 296-1420 
Attorney for Defendant Alan Lasson 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE A. DRAZICH, a/k/a LOUISE 
ANN DRAZICH, as an individual, and 
LOUISE A DRAZICH as Trustee of 
Trusts created by the Will of 
MARKO N. DRAZICH, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN LASSON, an individual, 
MARY D. WHITE, an individual, 
DARRELL L. WHITE, an individual, 
and DAVID A. WHITE, an individual 
Defendants. 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 940906967. PR 
Judge: William B. Bohling 
The above entitled matter having come on for trial, pursuant 
to notice, on September 26, September 27 and November 13, 1996, 
before the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling, oral arguments 
having been heard, evidence having been presented and Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law having been filed on November 26, 1996, 
this Court now ORDERS AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgement in the above entitled matter is hereby granted 
to Defendant Alan Lasson. 
& ft ft V -ft fa 
2. Defendant Alan Lasson is granted full possession of and 
quiet title to all of the following described real property (the 
"Subject Property") located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to 
wit : 
Commencing 4.7 chains South and 19.62 chains West from the 
East quarter corner, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 3.08 chains; 
thence South 45 deg. West 1.42 chains; thence North 4.15 
chains; thence East 1.13 chains to the point of beginning, 
all as shown on the Survey of Record recorded as Recordation 
No. 96-110466 in the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Surveyor. 
3. Plaintiff is hereby enjoined, debarred and restrained from 
claiming or asserting any right, title, interest or estate in and 
to the Subject Property. 
4. Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant Alan Lasson for all 
costs incurred in defending this action (excluding attorney's fees) 
upon submission of written evidence of said costs to Plaintiff 
and/or Plaintiff's counsel of record. 
5. Defendant Alan Lasson1s counterclaim for trespass is 
dismissed, with prejudice. 
6. Each party shall bearatheir own attorneyfs fees. 
DATED THIS O day of 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING S 
District Courts Jud^ ce^ " 
00S240 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, David P. 
Hirschi, attorney for Defendant Alan Lasson, will submit the 
foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER to the Honorable Judge Bohling for his 
signature, pursuant to Rule 206 of the Rules of Practice of the 
District Courts of the State of Utah, upon the expiration of eight 
days of the date of mailing this notice to you, unless you file 
objection thereto in writing. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this 16th day of December, 1996. 
David P/ Hirschi 
Attorney for Defendant Lasson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on this 16th day of December, 1996, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing by U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Brant H. Wall, Esq. 
Wall and Wall 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 800, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David P. 
L\Lass. j&o 
006241 
